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Mobile phones are a deus ex machina for the plights of the bottom billion. From 
Guadalajara to Gujarat, the mobile phone has jumpstarted an unforeseen communications 
revolution for those living on less than $2.00 daily. Nearly 650 million adults in sub-
Saharan Africa, about 70% of the population, have access to a mobile phone—more than 
the population of North America.1 The adoption rates for mobile phones have shot from 
10% to 90% in parts of Africa and Latin America within the last decade, rivaling the 
usage numbers of developed nations.2 For many, accessing a mobile phone is easier than 
accessing a toilet. 
Phones are useful for more than just placing calls, and communicative benefits 
have proliferated. Residents of Kathmandu can access the latest data on Himalayan 
earthquakes.3 Tanzanian farmers can receive daily texts updates on the spot price for 
coffee in Dar es Salaam.4 In Ghana, users of the health application mPedigree can check 
for counterfeit pharmaceuticals.5 Economic benefits also abound: studies have found that 
10 additional mobile phones per 100 people in a developing country will raise GDP by as 
much as 1.2%.6 Mobile phones also play a critical role in promoting financial inclusion 
by obviating the need for physical banks. Although 85% of sub-Saharan Africa lacks 
access to a formal savings account, mobile banking has informally filled the void by 
enabling millions to access services for savings, loans, transfers, and financial planning.7 
Of these services, transfers may prove the most consequential. Mobile payments, 
as transfers are commonly known, enable the virtual exchange of units of value from one 
phone to another. The units of value are legally mandated to maintain 1:1 parity with the 
national currency, and the exchange is usually controlled by a telecom (sometimes in 
conjunction with a bank). Mobile payments services worldwide numbered 263 by August 
2015, with dozens more in trial phase.8  
Arguably the most famous mobile payments service is Kenya’s M-Pesa (“mobile 
money” in Swahili). Started in 2007 by telecom Safaricom, this creatively named service 
annually handles transactions amounting to 60% of Kenya’s GDP.9 The most immediate 
benefit of mobile payments is a reduction in transfer costs: the cost to send 1000 Kenyan 
Shillings ($15 USD) from Nairobi to Turkana (from central to northwestern Kenya) via 
M-Pesa is just 7% of the cost to send money via matatu buses, the traditional method of 
informal money transfers. 10  M-Pesa saves users an average of $3 per transaction, 
remarkable when one considers that Kenya’s per-capita GDP is $1358.11 With time, the 
                                                 
1 Sambira, Jocelyne. “Africa’s mobile youth drive change.” Africa Renewal, United Nations, May 2013, 19. 
2 Etzo, Sebastiana, and Collender, Guy. “The mobile phone ‘revolution’ in Africa: rhetoric or reality?” 
African Affairs 109 (2010): 659-68. 
3 “Mobile phone data helps ongoing quake relief effort in Nepal.” University of Southampton, 9 November 
2015. 
4 Stolle, Sophie. “Why farmers in Tanzania are using Tigo Kilimo.” Tech Change, 3 June 2015. 
5 Talbot, David. “The mPedigree Network.” MIT Technology Review, 2014. 
6 “What is the impact of mobile telephony on economic growth?” GSM Association (2012): 1-32. 
7 Kendal, Jake, and Voorhies, Rodger. “The Mobile-Finance Revolution: How Cell Phones Can Spur 
Development.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2014. 
8 “MMU Deployment Tracker.” GSM Association, August 2015. 
9 Heinrich, Erik. “The apparent M-Pesa monopoly may be set to crumble.” Fortune, 27 June 2014. 
10 Morawczynski, Olga, and Miscione, Gianluca. “Examining trust in mobile banking transactions: the case 
of M-Pesa in Kenya.” International Federation For Information Processing, Vol. 282 (2008): 287-98. 
11 Gencer, Menekse. “The Mobile Money Movement: Catalyst to Jumpstart Emerging Markets.” 
Innovations, Winter 2011, 3-19. 
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reduced friction in payments has important microeconomic effects: income levels of 
households using M-Pesa rose by as much as 30% within three years of adoption, relative 
to peers.12 
 
      
 
The counterrevolution 
 The universal recognition of mobile payments as crucial to the war on poverty has 
not translated to universal success. The omnipresent example of M-Pesa belies the reality 
that only 21 mobile payments services claim greater than one million users. Despite the 
ubiquity of mobile payments, less than 1 in 10 sub-Saharan Africans are active users of 
mobile payments—a ratio skewed upward by the success of Kenya and Tanzania.13 If 
mobile transfers are crucial to alleviate poverty, then why does the probability of success 
for a typical mobile payments system rival the acceptance rate of Harvard College? 
 The existing literature explains this dissonance in several ways. First, regulatory 
barriers related to international AML/CTF/KYC14 requirements hamper telecoms’ ability 
to sign up new users because the world’s poorest lack the necessary paperwork for self-
identification.15,16 Second, the abjectly poor are uninterested in mobile money because of 
a predilection for cash, a misunderstanding of transfers, or a perceived lack of utility from 
its usage.17 Third, the cost of physical infrastructure related to mobile transfers (such as 
                                                 
12 “Why does Kenya lead the world in mobile money?” The Economist, 27 May 2013. 
13 “State of the Industry: Mobile Financial Services for the Unbanked.” GSM Association, December 2014. 
14 “Anti Money Laundering/Counterterrorism Financing/Know Your Customer.” These are three sets of 
international regulations meant to inhibit cross-border illicit financial activities. The regulations often 
require identification paperwork, a physical address, and proof of citizenship. 
15 Winn, Jane K. “Governance of global mobile money networks: the role of technical standards.” 
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 8 (2013). 
16 Nyaga, Joseph Kariuki. “Mobile banking services in the East African Community (EAC): challenges to 
the existing legislative and regulatory frameworks.” Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 4 (2014),  
17 Ssonko, George Wilson. “The role of mobile money services in enhancing financial inclusion in 
Uganda.” BOUWP, August 2010. 
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agent networks that handle conversion between physical and electronic money) offset 
expected returns, a cost compounded by the dispersed nature of rural populations.18 
 While important, these factors do not explain the extent of this failure because of 
their passivity. That is, these factors are non-incentivized and exogenous barriers that can 
be overcome by parties interested in the success of mobile payments. Regulations can be 
streamlined under governments wishing to promote mobile payments, as demonstrated by 
Kenya and Tanzania. The abject poor can learn the benefits of mobile transfers with 
targeted education programs, as demonstrated by successful programs in Zambia and 
Mexico.19,20 Infrastructure barriers are a red herring: telecoms can leverage pre-existing 
airtime distribution networks for the provision of mobile payments, as demonstrated by 
Safaricom in its usage of pre-existing airtime agents for the M-Pesa rollout.21 , 22 By 
emphasizing passive factors, the existing literature assumes that all major actors—banks, 
telecoms, and governments—are incentivized to foment the success of mobile payments, 
and that failure is exogenous to their decisions. That assumption is false. 
 This paper argues that banks, telecoms, and governments are incentivized to 
actively inhibit the success of mobile payments. The paper is divided into sections based 
on the relevant actors, providing theoretical and empirical warrants for actors’ incentives 
to restrict the dispersion of mobile payments systems. This thesis is entirely novel in the 
existing literature on mobile payments, likely explained by the conflation of benefits for 
users and benefits for providers. Existing literature does not fully recognize that relevant 
actors do not always benefit from increased mobile payments adoption. This paper aims 
to widen the circle of academic discussion on mobile payments to include actor-based 
incentives, necessary for a more holistic understanding of factors undergirding the future 
of mobile payments in developing countries. 
  
The incumbent 
 Payments are the lifeblood of banks. Between interchange fees and inter-account 
transfers, payments netted $1.3 trillion USD for banks worldwide in 2012—an estimated 
34% of global profits. Banks fear a future in which payments are not tied to formal bank 
accounts, as this would eliminate the opportunity for lucrative processing fees. Banks see 
this future unfolding in real time: in 2012 alone, mobile money subscribers in Uganda 
tripled from 2.9 million to 8.9 million as total bank accounts sat stagnant at 4.9 million. 
At least a dozen African countries, from Cameroon to Zambia, have more mobile money 
users than bank account holders.23  In the event that automatic clearinghouse (ACH) 
systems for the processing of formal money transfers are outmoded by mobile payments, 
many banks will be relegated to the low-margin and commoditized provision of loans. 
 Banks cannot capture the nascent market for mobile payments, as these systems 
are squarely in the domain of telecoms. Telecoms are the natural providers of mobile 
                                                 
18 “Mobile-money services: let us in.” The Economist, 25 August 2012. 
19 Lee, Julie. “Consumer education and mobile money adoption.” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 18 
January 2013. 
20 Casanova, Martha. “Unlocking barriers: advances in rural mobile banking in Mexico.” Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor, 20 August 2012. 
21 “Safaricom inks M-Pesa agent financing deal with KCB.” Telecompaper, 10 February 2011. 
22 All telecoms have large airtime networks because these networks are the primary sales method for new 
minutes on prepaid phones, which are more common than monthly phone plans in developing countries. 
23 “The end of a monopoly.” The Economist, 10 May 2014. 
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payments services because they own the phone networks on which the transfers function. 
Compounding this prima facie uphill battle is the advantage that telecoms gain from pre-
existing airtime distribution networks: the small shops that have sold pre-paid minutes to 
mobile phone users for years can be converted to mobile money agents with minimal 
incremental expenditures. Safaricom converted 22,000 airtime distributors into mobile 
money agents prior to the launch of M-Pesa, juxtaposed against the 4,000 bank branches 
among all Kenyan banks at this time.24 Telecoms derive a third advantage from lighter 
regulations governing airtime agents relative to traditional bank branches, meaning that 
costs for new bank branches surpass those of similarly functional telecom agents.25 
 
Agents and bank branches per 100,000 adults, select countries 
 
Country Banks Agents
Bangladesh 8.1 508.3
Cote d'Ivoire 4.6 107.3
Dem. Rep. of Congo 4.6 88.1
Haiti 2.7 21.6
India 11.4 18.3
Kenya 5.5 484.6
Madagascar 1.7 34.3
Mexico 14.5 32.6
Nigeria 5.8 36.5
Pakistan 9 149.8
Philippines 8.1 39.4
Rwanda 76 212.2
South Africa 10.4 10.6
Sri Lanka 17.5 114
Tanzania 2.2 564.6
Uganda 2.6 276.2
Zimbabwe 7.1 80.5
 
 
 Checkmate on the economic chessboard leaves banks with little recourse but to 
leverage regulatory channels against telecoms. In 2013, the Bankers Association of 
Zimbabwe successfully lobbied the central bank for a 5% fee increase on each mobile 
money transaction run by telecoms like Econet Wireless. This doubling of per-transfer 
costs likely served little purpose beyond discouraging the usage of mobile payments.26 
Banks pressure regulators to require telecoms to partner with banks on the provision of 
mobile payments, claiming (perhaps fairly) that telecoms lack the expertise necessary for 
                                                 
24 Etzo and Collender (2010). 
25 “Why does Kenya lead the world in mobile money?” The Economist, 27 May 2013. 
26 Severino, Mavhiki, Tonderai, Nyamwanza, and Life, Rhumba. “Impact of mobile banking on traditional 
practices in Zimbabwe.” International Journal of Economics, Commerce, and Management, 3.1 (2015). 
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taking deposits. This has proven successful in some instances, with governments such as 
Uganda and Nigeria drafting legislation aiming to formally require these partnerships.27,28 
 Banks may be defending themselves by lowering the utility that individuals can 
derive from adopting mobile payments. Increasing access to formal banking services is 
one method to achieve this end, as the presence of a large banked population frequently 
suffocates mobile payments. The formally banked population of South Africa increased 
from 46% to 75% during 2004-2014, driven by a multi-bank partnership that sought to 
provide low-cost Mzansi bank accounts to the rural poor.29 During that time, M-Pesa 
twice failed to enter the South African mobile transfers market despite skyrocketing 
growth in Kenya and Tanzania. Across the developing world, countries with higher levels 
of formally banked citizens exhibit diminishing success for mobile payments.30 
Financial services companies, which benefit from the success of banks, have also 
entered this fray. MasterCard works with Nigeria’s government to issue national IDs that 
double as prepaid bank cards, an effort meant to increase formal financial services among 
the world’s poorest.31 If the purpose of mobile payments is to provide financial inclusion 
for those excluded from the traditional banking system, then formally banking excluded 
citizens reduces much of this demand. Smaller banks that cannot face the high costs of 
new infrastructure will not pursue this option, but banks with sufficient infrastructure that 
have, until now, chosen to exclude the poorest populations (due to low transaction 
volumes) may see low-cost bank accounts as sufficient for profitability. This logic of 
mutual exclusivity explains the low usage of mobile payments in the developed world: if 
users have access to formal financial services, then informal services may not generate 
sufficient incremental utility to justify adoption. 
 Banks will not disappear. Mobile payments may supplant the role of transfers, but 
banks still offer beneficial services that require ample capital. Telecoms will likely not be 
financing mortgages or offering car loans in the near future, and in-person financial help 
will always trump mobile-based financial advisory services. But assuming that banks will 
accept relegation to the low-margin provision of loans is wishful thinking. Hannibal ad 
portas, and banks will not lose business to mobile payments without a protracted fight. 
 
The disruptor 
 Telecoms enable mobile payments, supplying the services via pre-existing airtime 
networks. Airtime networks are common in developing countries because prepaid phones 
are more popular than expensive monthly contacts; 90% of mobile phones in sub-Saharan 
Africa are pay-as-you-go.32 Airtime distributors are generally local shops that sell airtime 
alongside other basic convenience items. Before the existence of mobile money, airtime 
                                                 
27 Paelo, Anthea. “Mobile money: Taking on big banks.” CCRED Review, 2014, 1-3. 
28 Future research should address whether mobile payments experience a change in growth after the 
creation of bank-telecom partnerships, and whether these partnerships are more effective at expanding 
mobile payments systems than standalone telecoms. 
29 Khumalo, Jabulani. “FinScope South Africa 2014.” Finmark Trust, 2014, 1-12. 
30 Evans, David, and Pirchio, Alexis. “An empirical examination of why mobile money schemes ignite in 
some developing countries but flounder in most.” Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and 
Economics, No. 723, 2015 
31 “The end of a monopoly” (2014). 
32 James, Jeffrey, and Versteeg, Mila. “Mobile Phones in Africa: How Much Do We Really Know?” Social 
Indicators Research (2007): 117–126. 
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served a secondary and unofficial role as a means of transferring value: since all mobile 
phones required airtime, top-up minutes could function as a de-facto currency with 
relatively consistent value across a country.33 This functionality still exists. Nigerians in 
Lagos can text airtime codes to family members in Kano, who either redeem the airtime 
for minutes or sell the airtime codes back to an airtime agent at a slight discount; selling 
airtime back to the airtime agents allows one to cheaply cash out. Airtime transfers are 
immensely profitable for telecoms: airtime is a currency produced at nearly zero cost, 
then exchanged for real currency that flows directly to the bank’s bottom line.34,35 
 Telecoms will favor mobile money if revenues exceed costs. Theory dictates that 
mobile money transactions are profitable because banks can charge small fees on each 
transfer; research has found that mobile money can be profitable for near-monopolistic 
providers.36 Proponents of this analysis rightfully account for higher initial and recurring 
costs, such as costs of agent conversion and cost of AML/CTF/KYC compliance, which 
arise with the adoption of mobile payments systems. However, this analysis misses 
revenue cannibalization: mobile payments supplant more profitable airtime channels. 
Mobile money causes a direct loss of revenue from airtime transfers because consumers 
will not use both: mobile money offers consumers marginal benefits due to regulation-
guaranteed parity to the national currency.37 Mobile money threatens the more profitable 
revenue stream of airtime transfers, and telecoms are thus incentivized to actively inhibit 
this threat. 
 Regulations threaten telecom profitability with requirements for telecom-bank 
partnerships. As noted above, these requirements arise when banks lobby the government 
about what constitutes a deposit, as deposit acceptance is usually the dominion of banks. 
South Africa broadly defines deposit acceptance as any movement of funds, effectively 
mandating bank participation.38 In contrast, Kenya considers mobile money a deposit 
only when the telecom earns interest on the electronic currency, allowing Safaricom to 
operate sans heavy restrictions. When banks lobby to change this definition, telecom 
profits suffer: the aforementioned case of Econet in Zimbabwe resulted in a push “to 
force Econet to open up bank participation.”39 This threat varies from country to country, 
but can incentivize telecoms to preemptively suffocate nascent mobile payments systems. 
Regulations further harm telecom profitability via requirements for inter-telecom 
agent interoperability. Agent networks are a major competitive advantage for telecoms: 
Safaricom achieved early dominance with M-Pesa largely thanks to its network of 22,000 
agents (since expanded more than four-fold). Interoperability levels the playing field by 
making agent networks a public good for all telecoms, regardless of size. This creates a 
                                                 
33 “Airtime is money: the use of pre-paid mobile-phone minutes as a currency.” The Economist, Jan. 2013. 
34 Madise, Sunduzwayo. “Mobile money and airtime: emerging forms of money.” Malawi Law J. (2015). 
35 Further research should measure if countries where airtime transfers are illegal exhibit greater success for 
mobile payments, as telecoms may be more likely to support formal mobile transfers under legal mandate 
versus the status quo of maintaining low-cost airtime transfer networks. 
36 Leishman, Paul. “Is there really an money in mobile money?” GSM Association, October 2010. 
37 McKay, Claudia, and Pickens, Mark. “Why Distributing Mobile Money Is Harder than Airtime for 
MNOs.” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 21 June 2011. 
38 Bold, Chris. “Branchless Banking in South Africa.” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 28 June 2011. 
39 Robb, Genna, Tausha, Isaac, and Vilaakazi, Thando. “Competition and regulatory issues in emerging 
mobile paFuffyments markets: a case study of Zimbabwe.” Centre for Competition, Regulation and 
Economic DevelopFurther ment, 6 March 2015. 
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free-rider problem,40 since a small telecom could compete with Safaricom on mobile 
payments without up-front investment in an agent network—after all, Safaricom has 
already done the heavy lifting.41  
These requirements are not fictitious: in July 2014, the Competition Authority of 
Kenya (CAK) forced Safaricom to open its network of 85,000 agents to competitors after 
successful lobbying by rival Airtel.42 Safaricom is a near-monopoly in Kenyan payments 
and is unlikely to change its stance on M-Pesa due to this regulation. Nonetheless, the 
regulation is a warning for telecoms with more nascent mobile payments systems: 
Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa, and multiple other nations have seen pushes for agent 
interoperability. If telecoms believe that regulations will force the sharing of expensive 
agent networks with smaller rivals, they may calculate that this is a losing operation and 
be incentivized to halt the progression of mobile payments.43 
 
 
SMS usage before and after interoperability, select countries 
 
Country 
Interoperability 
established 
Pre-interoperability 
usage (mil/month) 
Post-interoperability 
usage (mil/month) 
One-year 
increase  
Australia Apr. 2000 50 500 1350% 
U.K. Apr. 1999 52 180 700% 
Portugal Feb. 2000 47 162 368% 
 
 
 Opposition to interoperability is problematic for the success of mobile payments. 
The high degree of network effects required for mobile payments means that, whenever 
monopolistic dominance is not present, telecoms must connect their systems in order to 
achieve sufficient scale.44 The early history of text messages in developed countries gives 
credence to this, as various countries experienced exponential growth in SMS usage 
directly after implementing network interoperability.45 When interoperability regulations 
tip the scales against profitability for telecoms, rationality dictates that telecoms will not 
choose to expand mobile payments. Compound this with the cannibalization of airtime 
revenues, and the incentives of telecoms will often align against mobile payments. 
 
The arbiter 
 Political theory asserts that governments should favor mobile money. If the state 
exists to serve its citizens, then the welfare enabled by financial and communicative gains 
provides ample incentives for governments to back this development. State support is the 
most important factor for the success of mobile payments because the state can shift the 
incentives of banks and telecoms to favor its emergence; for example, subsidies for first-
movers on infrastructure and streamlining AML/CTF/KYC requirements might alter the 
                                                 
40 Musa, Omoneka, Niehaus, Charles, and Warioba, Martin. “How Tanzania Established Mobile Money 
Interoperability.” Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 4 March 2015. 
41 Handford, Richard. “Ending M-Pesa’s solo story.” Mobile World Live, 19 August 2014. 
42 “The end of a monopoly” (2014). 
43 Winn (2013). 
44 Leibbrandt, Johan Gottfried. “Payment systems and network effects.” 3 June 2004. 
45 Saxena, Amitabh. “Three insights for digital payments interoperability.” Digital Disruptions, June 2015. 
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cost-benefit analysis for many telecoms. Kenya, Tanzania, and India are evidence of this 
possibility. However, state support is not the norm. Governments believe that the benefits 
of mobile money are negated by the specter of macroeconomic instability. 
 Governments fear the loss of seigniorage revenues. Seigniorage results from the 
central bank profiting on the difference between interest receipts on securities acquired 
from banks in exchange for newly printed currency, and the production costs for the new 
currency. These revenues are an important source of risk-free profits for the government, 
but the power to extract seigniorage is dependent on control over the unit of exchange. If 
citizens choose to use the mobile money instead of the legal tender, then printed currency 
will not be loanable to consumers (they will not accept it). Banks will not accept money 
that cannot be loaned for profits, and seigniorage will become untenable.46 
 
Seigniorage revenues as % of GDP in 2014, select countries47 
 
Country Seigniorage
Colombia 1.08%
Kenya 1.69%
Mozambique 3.67%
Nigeria 0.87%
Paraguay 3.44%
Sierra Leone 2.70%
Serbia 2.39%
Thailand 0.71%
Tanzania 1.52%
Uganda 2.51%
Zambia 0.36%
 
Governments with higher seigniorage revenues as a percentage of GDP appear to 
have less successful mobile payments systems relative to peers, although further analysis 
is difficult due to constraints on seigniorage data. 48  The general threat of losing 
seigniorage is nonetheless omnipresent: without seigniorage, the GDP of some countries 
would fall as much as 0.7%.49 Even if states can offset revenue losses via new taxes on 
mobile money, the loss of seigniorage still induces anxiety because the method functions 
as a last resort for revenue extraction via a de-facto inflation tax.  
 Governments also fear debasement of the legal tender caused by competition with 
mobile money to be the dominant unit of exchange. If the state does not monopolize the 
unit of exchange, then monetary policy is ineffective.50 The central bank cannot control 
                                                 
46 Arnone, Marco and Bandiera, Lucas. “Monetary Policy, Monetary Areas, and Financial Development 
with Electronic Money.” IMF Working Paper. July 2004. 
47 Seigniorage is estimated by multiplying notes and coins outstanding by the long-term rate of interest on 
government securities. Data from World Bank (2015). 
48 Further research should explore the relationship between seigniorage revenues and the success of mobile 
payments systems; this will require a more measurable definition of what constitutes a “successful” system. 
49 Leibbrandt (2004). 
50 Rolnick, Arthur J. “Panel: Thoughts on the Future of Payments and Central Banking.” Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, vol. 31, No. 3 (1999): 674-76 
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the money supply to influence the price level because consumption is no longer driven by 
supply and demand of legal tender, but rather of the competing electronic currency. For 
this reason, every state requires a 1:1 peg between mobile money and legal tender: if the 
electronic currency is fixed at the value of the national currency, then no fluctuations are 
possible and the electronic currency is a functional extension of the legal tender. 
 These regulations fail when parity is (illegally) eliminated. In 2013, the Ugandan 
Anti-Corruption Court issued fines to MTN Group for illegally generating 146 billion 
UGX (50 million USD) in electronic currency not backed by any legal tender, which was 
then cashed out by conspiring bankers. Reflecting on MTN’s ability to produce its own 
shillings, one observer noted that the stolen money was “printed by MTN itself.”51 This 
situation is not unique: Rwanda has witnessed similar fabrication by telecom Tigo, which 
generated 495 million francs (170,000 USD) without physical backing in 2014.52 Vigilant 
monitoring of telecoms can mitigate this threat, but states must live with the fear that 
illegal float generation could kill trust in the legal tender and cause rampant inflation. 
Unregulated payments systems also threaten currency parity. Bitcoin is the most 
famous example of an unregulated currency, and its near-global condemnation by states 
is widely attributed to government fears of a competing currency.53 Another example is 
airtime, which functions as a unit of exchange and has value derived from its local supply 
and demand. The best glimpse into state fears of mobile money is provided by QQ coin, 
an electronic currency developed by Chinese firm Tencent.54 The currency was created as 
an online payment system for electronic greeting cards, virtual games, and software, but 
grew so powerful that one Chinese official claimed, “QQ coin is challenging the status of 
the Renminbi [Yuan] as the only legitimate currency in China.” The Chinese government 
is now restricting issuance of QQ coins by Tencent, and is cracking down on vendors that 
accept the currency in lieu of legal tender.55 
 These scenarios threaten central banks. The primary function of a central bank is 
to prevent price indeterminacy, which leads to inflation when there is no mechanism to 
tie down the price level. Central banks traditionally tie down the price level using short-
term interest rates that prevent currency oversupply, but mobile money threatens this 
dynamic since the short-term interest rate cannot be controlled when the unit of exchange 
is no longer the legal tender.56 If the central bank wishes to create liquidity for another 
bank, it cannot meet this demand with “a stroke of the pen.” The central bank will instead 
need to borrow the mobile currency using collateral, and then lend the mobile currency to 
the commercial bank.  
 One crucial problem arises with collateral: it is not infinite, and will require the 
                                                 
51 Kiyonga, Derrick, and Mewsigwa, Alon. “Mobile money fraud: witnesses pin former bosses, Mwami 
exonerated.” The Observer, 18 February 2015. 
52 Morawczynski, Olga. “Fraud in Uganda: how millions were lost to internal collusion.” Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor, 11 March 2015. 
53 “Examining the future of Bitcoin.” Stratfor, 28 February 2014. 
54 Kuo, Lily. “China’s trillion dollar mobile payments industry is under attack.” Quartz, 25 March 2014. 
55 Fowler, Geoffrey A; Qin, Juying. “QQ: China's New Coin of the Realm?” WSJ, 30 March 2007. 
56 This problem still exists for 1:1 currency regimes due to the higher velocity of mobile money. Refer to 
the monetary equation of exchange, MV=PY. While the M (money) value will be known due to 1:1 fixed 
value, the velocity of the money increases with mobile money due to less transactional friction. If the 
mobile money is a sufficiently large portion of total transactions in the economy, and the central bank does 
not know the velocity of mobile money, its estimates of inflation will not reflect reality. This can lead to 
counterproductive monetary policies and an inability to hold down prices. 
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central bank to hold liquid securities purchased on the market.57 Even more important is 
that collateral creates an arbitrage opportunity for commercial banks. Rising interest rates 
on mobile money require the central bank to borrow money at that higher rate, but still 
lend it back to other banks at a lower-than-market rate (the desired level) in order to 
lower rates. The result is unavoidable: commercial banks will borrow from the central 
bank at the desired rate and lend back the same money back to the central bank at the 
market rate; this will produce unlimited gains for banks and correspondingly unlimited 
losses for the central bank. Lacking a monopoly on liquidity generation, the central bank 
loses its ability to reliably control short-term rates.58 
 Governments recognize the benefits of mobile payments for poverty alleviation, 
but also recognize the threat of adverse macroeconomic outcomes. Governments that rely 
on seigniorage revenues or fear that 1:1 currency pegs will be difficult to maintain will 
likely see long-term risks that cannot justify microeconomic advances. The state faces a 
Collingridge dilemma in that it must restrict mobile payments systems while they are still 
nascent.59 Until the link to the macroeconomic risks can be controlled, states will often be 
incentivized to inhibit the spread of mobile payments. 
 
The groundswell 
 The future of the world’s poorest citizens is contingent on the spread of mobile 
payments. Lower transaction costs, faster remittances, and access to financial services are 
all necessary conditions for the end of poverty. Successful systems can alter the national 
economy of the host country: $40 billion USD flowed through M-Pesa in 2013, compared 
to $27 billion in mobile transfers handled by PayPal worldwide in that same time.60 The 
dominance that mobile payments can achieve often threatens its own success, since 
critical actors view this growth as a risk to the stable status quo. For the banks, telecoms, 
and governments that dictate the emergence of mobile payments, the benefits to citizens 
do not outweigh the costs to their respective institutions. 
 To be certain, each institution has myriad incentives both for and against mobile 
payments. These incentives will vary for each actor. M-Pesa is not the same as Econet or 
Airtel, and Zimbabwe is not the same as Zambia. Lex parsimoniae will fail in some cases, 
and policymakers must be careful not to cut their throats on Occam’s razor. The common 
incentives that undergird decision-making for each actor nonetheless provide a guide for 
future research. Resolution may require a deus ex machina on par with mobile phones. 
 
                                                 
57 The central bank could opt to receive liquid securities directly from the Treasury, but this violates central 
bank independence that is a cornerstone of monetary systems today. 
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